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Abstract
This paper analyzes two interrelated aspects of banking crises: regulators’ choices
to rescue versus close troubled banks and banks’ choices of whether to passively roll
over and hide defaulting loans or to reveal and deal with them. Banks’ decisions
to ine¢ciently roll over rather than reveal their bad loans will depend upon their
…nancial state and the regulator’s expected policy choice. The regulator will apply
the least costly policy–closure or rescue–to detected troubled banks. The analysis
shows that if enough banks are discovered to be distressed, a situation labelled “too-
many-to-fail” can arise, in which high social costs of bank closures make rescues less
costly. Yet, the prospect of too-many-to-fail can cause banks to roll over their loans
in expectation of being rescued if detected. The banks’ beliefs become self-ful…lling,
and the regulator may be drawn into a situation where it is cheaper to rescue troubled
banks. Finally, the prospect of being caught in a situation of too-many-to-fail may
induce the regulator to set a low bank supervisory quality (detection probability),
which will result in fewer detections of banks with loan rollovers but will permit the
regulator to apply closure to detected banks.
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1 Introduction
Banking sector problems are common throughout the world. A recent IMF study (1997)
lists 130 countries as having experienced banking sector problems in the 1980s and 1990s.
Once banking sector problems have occurred, regulators are faced with the question of
whether to close troubled banks or to leave them open and rescue them. In practice
regulators often become reluctant to close troubled banks once a banking crisis is perceived
to be systemic. By allowing banks to continue in operation, regulators attempt to avoid
negative externalities, such as losses in “inside” information regarding good borrowers of the
banks being closed, …nancial contagion to other banks through the interbank loan market,
or disruption of the payments system.
Yet, a factor complicating regulators’ decisions regarding closure versus rescue of trou-
bled banks in a banking crisis is the presence of asymmetric information between banks and
regulators regarding the quantity of bad loans’ on banks’ balance sheets. This asymmetric
information creates a moral hazard problem on the part of banks. Troubled banks have the
ability to hide their bad loans by rolling them over, and they regularly do so in practice.
Loan rollovers may be motivated by an attempt on the part of insolvent banks to hide their
insolvency or by gambling for resurrection by troubled banks. Like the granting of new,
excessively risky loans, passive rollover of defaulting loans constitutes a risky action that
will resolve the bank’s di¢culty if the defaulting borrower eventually succeeds in repaying
the loan; however, the low probability of success lowers the bank’s expected net worth.
Rollover of bad loans (or “evergreening” as the practice is sometimes called) thus worsens
banks’ …nancial conditions and exacerbates, or even generates, a banking crisis.
This paper focuses on these two, interrelated aspects of banking sector problems: regu-
lators’ choices to rescue versus close troubled banks (where bank “closure” includes liqui-
dations, mergers, or purchase and assumptions); and troubled banks’ choices of whether to
passively roll over or to reveal and deal with their defaulting loans. Both closure and rescue
policies have been observed in practice. Closure policies are observed most often, especially
in response to situations in which only a few banks are experiencing di¢culty. This type of
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policy was also applied, after initial regulatory forbearance, in the U.S. Savings and Loans
crisis. Countries that have applied various forms of rescue in banking crises include Japan,
Norway, Mexico, Korea, Thailand, the Philippines and a number of economies in transition,
including Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland.
The model of this paper departs from existing banking literature in two ways. First,
most models of bank closure assume symmetric information between banks and regulators
regarding the …nancial health of the bank at the point where the regulator must make the
closure decision.1 In these models the regulator’s decision is based upon the expected future
pro…t of the bank, which is known to the regulator and the bank. Second, the regulator’s
closure decision in most models is made before the bank’s assets are actually in default;
therefore, there is little scope for consideration of policies to deal with bad assets on banks’
balance sheets. The model of this paper adds to a small set of papers that formalize banks’
treatment of debt in default, assuming asymmetric information between the regulator and
the bank concerning the level of default on the bank’s balance sheet.2
Faced with a given number of banks that have been discovered to be in trouble, the
regulator chooses the policy–rescue or closure–that is least costly. (The regulator cannot
commit ex ante to a particular policy because ex post the policy must be credible.) Policy
costs involve the following tradeo¤s. The bene…t of bank closure relative to rescue is that
with closure the expected net worth of bank assets is increased, since proper disposal or
transfer of the closed bank’s assets entails making e¢cient decisions with respect to default-
ing borrowers (i.e., restructuring or liquidating them, rather than passively rescheduling
loans). In more general terms, bank closures halt the excessively risky behavior in which
troubled banks may be engaging; therefore, closure raises bank value. The extra cost of
closure relative to rescue comes from the fact that closures can generate social costs due to
negative externalities, which are increasing in the number of banks closed.
1See, for example, Boot and Thakor (1993), Mailath and Mester (1994), Dreyfus et al. (1994), and
Rochet and Tirole (1996). A notable exception to the assumption of symmetric information between
regulators and banks is the work of Dewatripont and Tirole (1994), who assume that banks may make
unobserved choices between continuing or stopping projects that default. However, these authors do not
endogenize the bank’s choice, nor do they analyze the regulator’s bank closure or rescue decisions.
2See Aghion, Bolton, and Fries (1999), Corbett and Mitchell (2000), and Mitchell (2001). Two papers
that model banks’ reporting of bad loans in contexts that are unrelated to regulatory response to banking
crises are O’Hara (1993) and Rajan (1994).
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I specify cost functions for the policies of closure and rescue and show that for small
numbers of troubled banks identi…ed by the regulator, closure is less costly than rescue;
therefore, closure is the preferred policy. I then show that if the number of discovered
troubled banks becomes high enough, the costs of closure may rise above the costs of
rescue; hence, rescue becomes the preferred policy. I de…ne this situation as one of “too-
many-to-fail.”3 This situation arises principally as a result of the external costs generated
by large numbers of bank closures. But whereas the policy chosen by the regulator will be
a function of the number of banks discovered to be in distress, the number of discovered
distressed banks will itself depend upon the willingness of banks to reveal their bad debts.
The regulator discovers banks that have rolled over defaulting loans with some positive
probability through monitoring (banking supervision). When banks reveal and e¢ciently
address their bad loans (e.g., through bankruptcy procedures), these activities are costlessly
observed by the regulator. Although rolling over bad loans lowers expected bank net worth,
if rollover succeeds it will eliminate the bank’s …nancial distress. Loan rollovers also allow
the banker to continue operating the bank, provided that the loan rollovers are not detected
by the regulator.4 In contrast, if the bank’s …nancial state is poor enough, revealing bad
loans may result in bank closure (if the regulator chooses the policy of closure), whereby
the bank manager loses the private bene…ts of operating the bank.
A …rst result of the analysis is that when troubled banks have a high enough proportion
of bad loans so that they would be insolvent even if they were to take e¢cient actions with
respect to their defaulting debtors, these banks will always roll over their loans. While it
is not surprising that insolvent banks will roll over their bad loans when they expect the
policy of closure, it may be more surprising that they will roll over bad loans even when
they expect the policy of rescue. In the latter case the motivation for loan rollovers is
not to hide insolvency but to gamble for resurrection. In this case insolvent banks know
that if their loan rollovers are discovered, they will be rescued and allowed to continue in
3The model of this paper formalizes and generalizes the description in Mitchell (1993) of a situation
of too-many-to-fail among banks in transition economies. Perotti (1998) models a situation where gov-
ernments in transition economies intervene to bail out …rms when arrears in interenterprise credit become
very large.
4Although troubled banks may be insolvent, they are not illiquid. It is in fact quite common for insolvent
banks to remain liquid for a considerable period. For example, most of the insolvent S&Ls during the U.S.
S&L crisis were liquid up to the point of closure.
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operation; therefore, they have little to lose by gambling through loan rollovers.
A second result pertains to banks that are distressed but not yet insolvent; i.e., banks
which could remain solvent if they were to reveal and e¢ciently deal with their bad loans.
When these banks expect the regulator to apply a policy of closure and when the probability
of detection of loan rollovers is high enough, banks will reveal and deal with their bad loans.
Troubled banks will thus remain solvent, and the regulator does not have to apply either
rescue or closure. However, if enough banks are troubled, the possibility of a situation of
too-many-to-fail creates a coordination problem. If each troubled bank believes that enough
other banks will roll over their bad loans so that the high number of such banks discovered
by the regulator will trigger too many to fail, then the troubled bank has the incentive
to roll over its loans. The regulator is then forced into rescuing banks by the banks’ self-
ful…lling beliefs, and banking sector problems are exacerbated, since banks’ loan rollovers
have lowered their expected net worth.
A …nal result comes from the observation that banks’ treatment of bad loans and the
regulator’s policy choice with respect to troubled banks are both functions of the number
of troubled banks actually discovered by the regulator, hence of the quality of banking su-
pervision. Banking supervisory quality (probability of detection of passive banks) is costly
and is chosen by the regulator ex ante, before any loan defaults have occurred. An interest-
ing question is how the ex ante choice of detection probability might be a¤ected when the
regulator takes into account the potential impact of this choice on banks’ subsequent will-
ingness to reveal their bad loans and on the regulator’s ex post policy choice once a banking
crisis has occurred. Somewhat surprisingly, if the regulator believes that in a banking crisis
troubled banks will roll over their loans in anticipation of triggering too many to fail, then
the regulator will choose a lower detection probability. By doing this the regulator can
ensure himself of discovering fewer troubled banks in a crisis, which allows him to commit
implicitly to closing the troubled banks that he actually discovers. Moreover, the total
costs generated by the choice of low supervisory quality and by closure of a smaller number
of troubled banks are lower than the total costs that would be generated by the choice of
a higher supervisory quality followed by rescues of many troubled banks.
This “softening” of banking supervision in the face of the prospect of too many to fail
suggests that in emerging market economies, where the risk of banking sector problems
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is high, it may be impossible for regulators to put into place strict banking regulations
without running the risk of having to bail out the entire banking system. It may thus not
be surprising to observe relatively lax standards of banking supervision or capital adequacy
being employed in these countries, perhaps with these standards being strengthened over
time. The result of supervisory softening also has a counterpart in developed economies.
Regulators often relax regulations on bank solvency or loan write-o¤s during a banking
crisis. For example, U.S. regulators relaxed the de…nition of bank solvency during the
Savings and Loan crisis so that fewer banks would qualify as insolvent and so that the total
costs borne by regulators in the handling of insolvent banks would be reduced. Japanese
regulators also softened regulations during the Japanese banking crisis in order to allow
more banks to qualify for favorable tax treatment of loan writeo¤s.5
2 Model
There are N banks of equal size in the economy, and each has liabilities of L. In period
1 each bank has outstanding risky loans in the amount of B. It also has other, nonrisky
sources of income, I0; such as income from provision of services or from the holding of
government debt. A number M of the banks in the economy will experience loan defaults
at the beginning of period 1. For these banks, the fraction of the portfolio in default is
given by ®: AlthoughM is assumed to be known to the regulator, which banks experience
default is not known in the absence of monitoring.6
The period-1 income for a bank that experiences loan defaults is given by I0+(1¡®)B:
This bank chooses between two actions with respect to its defaulting loans: being passive
or being active. The choice of passivity represents a decision to roll over (i.e., reschedule)
loans, with no liquidation or restructuring of the defaulting debtors. The passive bank
5Boot and Thakor (1993) show that regulators who are self-interested may engage in forbearance in
order to preserve their reputations. The model of this paper shows that even when regulators are not
self-interested, they may have a tendancy to soften banking regulations in the face of a banking crisis. The
softening here arises as a result of the inability of regulators to commit ex ante to applying a tough policy
to banks in a crisis.
6Assuming that the regulator knows M is similar to assuming that the regulator has a good idea of
the severity of banking sector problems; however, without monitoring he does not have a good idea of the
…nancial state of each bank.
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allows defaulting …rms to continue operating according to the status quo. Bank passivity
generates ine¢ciencies (and translates into lower loan recovery) whenever the borrower
…rm’s liquidation value is greater than its continuation value or its value with restructuring
would be greater than its continuation value according to the status quo.
When a bank chooses to be active, it attempts to recover at least a portion of the out-
standing debt, either through a formal bankruptcy proceeding or an out-of-court workout.
I use the terms “active banks” and “banks using bankruptcy” synonymously throughout
the paper. Active banks take the e¢cient restructuring or liquidation decision with respect
to their defaulting debtors. At the same time, the use of bankruptcy (or out-of-court work-
out) is assumed to be costlessly observable by the regulator. Thus, when a bank chooses to
be active, the regulator can costlessly observe the level of default in the bank’s portfolio.
I assume deposits are insured. Because depositors will not monitor the bank in the
presence of deposit insurance, the regulator’s monitoring role is crucial. Monitoring of
banks by the regulator takes place in period 1 after banks have observed their bad loans
(which is private information to banks) and have chosen their actions with respect to these
loans. Monitoring requires each bank to submit to a periodic bank examination, during
which the regulator reviews bank income statements and attempts to determine if the bank
has bad loans in its portfolio and if it has taken appropriate actions with respect to those
loans. With probability d the regulator discovers banks that have rolled over loans. Banks
that have rolled over their loans but which are not discovered look to the regulator like
banks with no defaulting loans. The parameter d represents a costly monitoring capability
which has been chosen by the regulator in period 0. (The choice of monitoring capability
is discussed in more detail below.) Assumptions regarding the monitoring function and the
informational abilities of the regulator follow from two stylized facts. (1) Observation of a
bank’s …nancial standing is costly; and (2) it is in general much more di¢cult to identify a
bank in …nancial di¢culty than it is a bank that is healthy.7
The total number of distressed banks identi…ed by the regulator will be the sum of the
number of banks with defaulting loans that have chosen to be active and the number of
7An example consistent with this fact appears in U.S. banking history. New York was the …rst state in
the United States to set up a bank supervisory authority. After its establishment in 1829, however, this
authority was abolished in 1843 beacuse the legislature believed that the commissioners “[w]ere super‡uous
when bankers were honest, and of no avail when bankers were dishonest.” (Klebaner, p. 44)
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passive banks which the regulator has detected through monitoring. Given the number
of distressed banks that the regulator has identi…ed, he chooses the least costly of two
policies, intervention (i.e., bank “closure”) or rescue, to apply to these banks. A key
aspect of the model is that the regulator’s choice of policy must be subgame perfect. That
is, the regulator is unable to commit in period 0 to applying a particular policy in period 1
if that policy is not the least costly one in period 1. If, given the number of troubled banks
identi…ed by the regulator in period 1, the policy of rescue is less costly than intervention,
the regulator will choose to rescue the troubled banks.
It is clear that the inability of the regulator to precommit to applying a particular
policy to troubled banks implies that banks with defaulting loans in period 1 will choose
their actions with respect to these loans as a function of the policy that they expect the
regulator to choose. The number of identi…ed banks will thus be a function of the banks’
choices with respect to their defaulting loans and also of the parameter d, the probability
of detection of passive banks:
Of interest is how the regulator’s choice of monitoring capability (d) in period 0 might
be in‡uenced by expected bank behavior in period 1 and by the regulator’s resulting policy
choice in that period, given the number of troubled banks that have been identi…ed. The
regulator will choose d in period 0 subject to a cost and subject to the regulator’s beliefs
about the number M of banks that are likely to face defaulting loans in period 1, the
regulator’s anticipation of the number of troubled banks that will be identi…ed, and the
expected policy to be applied to these banks.
The time line below summarizes the sequence of events.
Timing:
Period 0
Regulator establishes costly monitoring capability d;
Period 1
Banks observe income and default, which are private information to the banks;
Banks choose action (passive or active) with respect to defaulters;
Regulator monitors and, with probability d, discovers passive banks;
Regulator chooses policy for all identi…ed distressed banks
Period 2
8
Banks receive returns from loans in default in period 1 and repay liabilities L
Bankers receive payo¤, depending on whether discovered to be distressed in period 1
and depending upon regulator’s choice of policy
2.1 Bank Strategies
Passive rollover of defaulting loans is assumed to to be a riskier action than bankruptcy
and to yield a lower expected level of loan recovery than bankruptcy. Bankruptcy yields
a higher expected return than rollover because bankruptcy allows the bank to take the
action (reorganization or liquidation) with respect to the …rm that maximizes the value of
the …rm’s assets. The greater uncertainty of repayment with rollover than with bankruptcy
arises because with rollover there is no meeting of the bank with the …rm’s other creditors to
gather information about and value the …rm, as would occur with bankruptcy (see Harris
and Raviv, 1990). The bank thus obtains less information about the value of the …rm
and the …rm manager’s activities, and there is also greater scope for the …rm manager to
undertake unpro…table activities without getting caught.8
Speci…cally, when a bank rolls over loans in the amount of B, the return is assumed to
be B with probability q and 0 with probability (1¡ q). The return from bankruptcy for
defaulting loans in the amount of B is given by ~B, with B > ~B > qB.
Assumption 1: The banker’s utility is given by max[¦; 0] + ½, where ¦ represents
bank pro…t (net worth) and ½ represents a private bene…t from operating the bank.9
Assumption 1 implies that bank managers obtain a monetary bene…t proportional to
bank net worth, as long as net worth is positive, plus a private bene…t of maintaining the
bank in operation.
In subsequent sections I adopt di¤ering assumptions regarding the level of default ®
on banks’ balance sheets (i.e., regarding the severity of the banking crisis). In all cases,
however, the level of default ® will be assumed to be high enough relative to the bank’s
8See Mitchell (2001) for an analysis of the indirect e¤ect on bank net worth arising from borrower …rm
managers’ unpro…table activities in response to loan rollovers.
9Similar objective functions are employed in Aghion, Bolton, and Fries (1999), Corbett and Mitchell
(2000), Mitchell (2001), and Rajan (1994).
9
liabilities that a bank with loan defaults in period 1 cannot meet liabilities L from period-
1 income alone. (Full recovery of debts B; however, does allow the bank to cover its
liabilities.)10 In addition, I assume that banks with loan defaults are in poor enough
…nancial shape that their expected net worth will be negative if they roll over loans in
default. The following assumption summarizes these statements.
Assumption 2: (i) I0 +B > L ; and (ii) I0+ (1 ¡ ®)B + q®B < L:
Assumption 2 implies that rolling over loans constitutes a form of gambling for resurrec-
tion. With probability q the bank will recover the full amount B of the loan and will return
to solvency. Failure of loan rollovers, which occurs with probability (1¡q), guarantees that
the bank is insolvent.
What happens to a bank when it chooses rollover? If it is not detected and if rollover
succeeds, the bank will be solvent in period 2; in this case the banker will earn a positive
monetary return plus the private bene…t ½ from keeping the bank in operation through
period 1. If the bank is not detected and rollover fails, the bank will be insolvent in period
2 and the banker will earn no monetary return; however, she still earns ½ since by not being
detected the bank has been able to continue in operation during period 1. If the passive
bank is detected by the regulator, then the banker’s payo¤ will depend upon the policy
chosen by the regulator.
2.2 The regulator’s objective
The regulator’s objective in choosing the policy to apply to troubled banks in period 1 is
to minimize costs, where the costs of a policy include any social costs linked to negative
externalities created by the policy. The objective assumed for the regulator is a realistic
one; for example, it is consistent with the directives in the U.S. legislation FDICIA.11 The
regulator’s policy choice in period 1 will thus be the policy with the lowest costs, given the
number of troubled banks that have been identi…ed.
In the sections below I …rst analyze the regulator’s choice of policy in period 1, together
1 0 I assume that the bank’s liabilities come due in period 2; therefore, the bank’s solvency is determined
by its two-period earnings minus liabilities. Because no deposit liabilities come due in period 1, banks that
are insolvent can remain liquid.
1 1See Wall (1993). Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) also suppose this type of objective for regulators.
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with banks’ choices with respect to their defaulting loans, given some value of d: These are
continuation equilibria, and they have the form (Action, Policy; d) where Action represents
the action taken by banks and Policy is the regulator’s policy choice. Since the regulator’s
policy choice occurs after the bank’s choice of action, the latter is analyzed via backward
induction.
An equilibrium will be described as a triplet (d, Action, Policy) consisting of the reg-
ulator’s period-0 choice of ex ante monitoring capability d, together with the continuation
equilbrium that will be induced by d in period 1. Monitoring costs are assumed to be
an increasing, convex function g(d) of the probability of detection of loan rollovers. The
costs included in g(¢) represent resources that are necessary to ensure that each bank faces
a probability d of discovery if it chooses to roll over its loans. These resources include
personnel, training, regulations, etc. The regulator’s objective in choosing d (and the con-
tinuation equilibrium induced by d) is assumed to be the minimization of total expected
costs arising from default on banks’ balance sheets. Expected costs consist of g(¢) plus the
expected costs of the policy that will applied in period 1:
In the next section I describe more precisely what is meant by the policies of intervention
and rescue, and I de…ne the costs of these policies.
3 Ex post policies and their costs
3.1 Rescue vs. intervention
What is a bank rescue? A reading of the literature on banking sector problems reveals the
absence of a universally accepted de…nition. Some authors have interpreted bank rescue
to be any policy other than bank liquidation. (See Goodhart, 1993) According to this
interpretation, a merger of a troubled bank with another bank constitutes a bank rescue,
even if the troubled bank’s management is removed. Other authors have associated the term
bank rescue with the policy of continuation and recapitalization of the troubled bank. Bank
mergers would not be considered rescues according to this interpretation. Contributing to
the ambiguity is the term bank bailout, which is suggestive of rescue but which has been
used to describe the regulatory response to the U.S. savings and loans crisis, in which
troubled S&Ls were liquidated but depositors reimbursed.
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Much of the ambiguity surrounding the term bank rescue arises from the fact that the
policies that constitute rescue depend upon the group of agents whose point of view is being
adopted. From the point of view of depositors, any policy resulting in reimbursement of
deposits would constitute a rescue. Thus, depositors were bailed out in the U.S. Savings
and Loans crisis although the S&Ls were liquidated. In terms of bank stockholders, any
policy that preserves the value of a troubled bank’s equity, such as a bank merger in which
the original bank’s stockholders receive equity in the acquiring bank, would constitute a
rescue. Yet, from the point of view of bank management, a bank merger in which the
management is replaced would not constitute a rescue.
This paper employs policy de…nitions that incorporate the e¤ects on bank management.
The motivation for de…ning policies in this way is the view that bank management possesses
private information regarding the bank’s …nancial state, and the management controls to a
large extent the degree of revelation of this information to outsiders, including regulators,
depositors, and bank stockholders. The policy applied by regulators to troubled banks will
in‡uence the extent to which bank management willingly reveals the bank’s …nancial state.
A policy of intervention represents a “tough” policy, which includes any of the following
types of activities: additional bank audits to better determine the …nancial state of the
bank, followed by imposition of appropriate treatment of defaulting debtors whose loans
were rolled over; replacement of bank management; bank liquidation; merger with another
bank; government control of the bank for some period. Any policy that does not result in
continuation of the bank under the same management or that involves active interference
in the bank’s operations (and thus causes the banker to lose the private bene…t ½) falls
under the category of intervention. According to this de…nition a merger of a troubled
bank or some of its assets with another bank constitutes a policy of intervention. This
classi…cation of merger as a form of intervention rather than rescue is consistent with the
empirical observation that the original bank’s management is often removed in troubled
bank mergers.
A policy of rescue, in contrast, is a “soft” policy in which the bank is continued in
operation, and the bank is recapitalized if necessary. More precisely, a bank rescue will be
de…ned as a policy of continuation and recapitalization of the troubled bank, together with
preservation of the bank manager’s control. Bank rescues involve no active interference
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by the regulator in the bank’s operations; therefore, the regulator does not impose on the
bank e¢cient treatment of defaulting debtors or of any other assets.
One policy for which the classi…cation of intervention or rescue is not immediately
obvious is the creation of an asset management company (AMC) to which banks transfer
a portion of their bad debt. Whether the creation of AMCs quali…es as intervention or
rescue depends upon several factors, such as whether the AMC is a private or a public
institution and how much discretion banks are allowed to exercise regarding the loans
that are transferred to the AMC. In practice, this type of policy may require detailed
examination and assessment by regulators of the bank’s loan portfolio in order to determine
the bank’s true …nancial health, with decisions being taken by a regulatory body with regard
to the bank’s transfer of loans. In this case the policy would qualify as intervention.12
Another policy with an ambiguous classi…cation as either intervention or rescue is bank
nationalization. If nationalization implies government involvement in bank management,
then bank nationalization quali…es as an intervention policy. If, however, when a bank is
nationalized, the government provides recapitalization but leaves complete control to the
original mangement, then this form of nationalization falls into the category of rescue. In
the latter case the bank manager retains all of her private bene…ts of control.
The costs of both intervention and rescue policies will be shown below to depend upon
the number of banks to which the policy is applied. A situation where too many to fail
takes e¤ect will be de…ned as one in which, given the number of …nancially distressed banks
identi…ed by the regulator, it becomes less costly to apply rescue than intervention to these
banks. In the subsections below I derive simple, illustrative cost functions for rescue and
1 2The following is a description of the resource requirements of this type of policy based on Swedish
experience with it. “After a preliminary application, the bank [requiring …nancial support] had to submit
information for an assessment of its current situation and future prospects. Then the Bank Support
Authority [a supervisory authority created during the crisis for the purpose of administering the policy]
would judge whether there was a need for support. If it was needed, more detailed information was
required, including a comprehensive valuation of all bank assets—performing and nonperforming—together
with a detailed assessment of future cash ‡ows and pro…ts from the bank’s ordinary operations. On
this basis the BSA, after considering the views expressed in consultations with the central bank and the
supervisory authority, took a preliminary decision, which was forwarded to the Ministry of Finance for …nal
endorsement. The decision stipulated the form and conditions under which support would be provided.”
(Ingves and Lind, 1997, p. 426.)
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intervention policies that allow for the possibility of a situation of too many to fail. This
possibility will arise as a result of a convexity of intervention costs in the number of banks to
which intervention is applied. Much of the discussion of costs associated with intervention
policies, therefore, is aimed at justifying the convex form of the intervention cost function
used in the analysis. Obviously, if intervention costs are always lower than rescue costs
for any given number of distressed banks, then the situation of too many to fail can never
occur, and intervention will always be the regulator’s policy choice.
3.2 Costs of rescue
The policy of rescue involves recapitalization of banks in period 1.13 One component of
rescue costs, then, is the recapitalization cost for distressed banks that are rescued by the
regulator. However, there also is a second component of rescue costs: the expected future
deposit insurance liabilities with respect to insolvent banks that are not discovered in period
1 by the regulator (and are, therefore, not recapitalized).14 Given that the regulator wishes
to minimize costs, the amount of recapitalization that will be extended to a rescued bank
will always be the minimum amount necessary to ensure the solvency of the bank.
Because, by de…nition, the policy of rescue involves no outside interference in the
bank’s operations, the regulator imposes no change in the bank’s treatment of its de-
faulting debtors. Thus, if rescue is applied to a bank that has rolled over loans in default,
these loans remain rolled over, and there is a decrease in expected bank net worth due to
the ine¢cient treatment of defaulting borrowers. This decrease in net worth is taken into
account in the amount of recapitalization given to the bank.15
1 3The results of the model also go through if recapitalization is given in period 2.
1 4For expositional simplicity, recapitalization and deposit insurance liabilities are included at their full
values in the rescue cost function. To the extent that these are simply costless transfers, they do not
represent real costs for the regulator. However, if generating one dollar of recapitalization costs more than
one dollar (and if deposit insurance liabilities cannot be covered by the deposit insurance fund), these
transfers do generate real costs. Assuming that the costs of rescue equal only some fraction of the amount
of recapitalization would in fact reinforce the results of the paper.
1 5Caprio and Honohan (1999) note that “bank supervisors do not have the inside information or the
resources to challenge the bank’s assessment of its loans on a case-by-case basis,” and “even with the
best accounting systems, it is di¢cult to prevent a bank from concealing a nonperforming loan simply by
making a new loan to cover the repayment, a practice knows as ‘evergreening.”’ These quotes capture the
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Consider a bank that has rolled over its loans, is discovered by the regulator, and is
then rescued. Given that there is a positive probability that the loan rollovers will fail and
the bank will recover nothing on its defaulting loans in period 2, the minimum amount
of recapitalization that must be given to this bank in period 1 in order to guarantee its
solvency in period 2 is given by
RP(®) = L ¡ I0 ¡ (1 ¡ ®)B: (1)
Recapitalization for the passive bank is just equal to the bank’s total liabilities minus its
period-1 income.
Consider a troubled bank that chooses bankruptcy for its defaulting debtors and is
rescued. By de…nition, this active bank has revealed its bad loans and is e¢ciently dealing
with its defaulting borrowers. The amount of recapitalization extended to this bank will
be given by
RA(®) = max[0; (L¡ I0 ¡ (1¡ ®)B ¡® eB)]: (2)
It is clear that RP (®) > RA(®); the cost of recapitalization is higher for passive banks that
are rescued than for active banks.
Now consider a bank that rolls over its loans and is not discovered by the regulator
and, therefore, is not rescued. As noted above, there are implicit costs generated by this
bank in the form of expected deposit insurance liabilities in period 2. Namely, if rollover
fails the passive bank will be insolvent in period 2, and the regulator will have to reimburse
depositors. In period 1 the expected future deposit insurance reimbursement is given by
Z(®) = (1¡ q)[L¡ I0 ¡ (1¡ ®)B]: (3)
Note that Z(®) = (1¡ q)RP(®); expected future deposit insurance liabilities for undiscov-
ered passive banks are lower than the recapitalization that must be o¤ered to passive banks
that are rescued.16
features of asymmetric information between banks and regulators that would e¤ectively require regulators
to undertake what is termed here a policy of intervention in order to reverse any ine¢cient treatment by
banks of their defaulting loans.
1 6Alternative assumptions could be made with respect to the timing of recapitalization. For example,
the choice of rescue in period 1 could be taken to imply that the regulator promises to recapitalize the bank
in period 2 if it turns out that the bank is insolvent in period 2 after its returns on defaulting loans have
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We may now de…ne the total costs associated with the policy of rescue. Suppose, for
simplicity, that all banks with default have the same proportion ® of their portfolio in
default. Suppose, for the moment, that all banks with default are passive. Let M be the
number of banks with default and d the probability of detection of a passive bank. Rescue
will then be applied to dM banks. Total rescue costs are given by
CRe s(M;djPass) = dM ¢ [RP(®)] + (1¡ d)M ¢ [Z(®)]
= [1 ¡ q(1 ¡ d)] ¢M ¢RP(®): (4)
Note that CRe s(M;djPass) is increasing in d; the lower is d; the lower are the costs of
rescue. In e¤ect, with a lower detection probability the regulator can bene…t from the
“gambling” undertaken by the passive bank in rolling over its loans. If rollover succeeds,
the regulator’s future deposit insurance liabilities will be zero.17 Eqn. (4) thus implies that
when all troubled banks are passive, the regulator would prefer a situation of complete
forbearance; i.e., d = 0; to a situation where d is positive and dM banks are rescued.
Now suppose that all M banks with default are active; rescue will then be applied to
all M banks. In this case rescue costs are given by
CRes(M;djAct) = M ¢RA(®): (5)
If active banks are solvent, RA(®) = 0, and rescue costs are zero. Note that the right-hand
side of Eqn. (5) is independent of the value of d; when banks are active, loan defaults are
costlessly revealed to the regulator.
3.3 Intervention costs
Because various policies involving several di¤erent types of costs fall under the category
of intervention, it is di¢cult to specify a general cost function for this policy category. I
been realized. This would imply that if loan rollovers succeed, the bank will receive no recapitalization but
if loan rollovers fail, the bank receives RP (®): Modeling the timing of recapitalization in this way would
change none of the qualitative results of the analysis. One minor change, however, would be that with this
timing the expected recapitalization of passive banks RP (®) would now just equal the expected deposit
insurance liabilities Z(®) of undiscovered passive banks.
1 7Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) also discuss how regulators may bene…t from banks’ gambling during
a banking crisis.
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identify below several types of costs associated with intervention policies, then I specify a
simple cost function that focuses on only some of these costs. The goal is to specify a cost
function with a functional form that is precise enough to permit comparative statics results
to be derived.
Before identifying costs involved with intervention policies, however, it should be re-
called that intervention policies generate a bene…t, which is the increase in passive banks’
net worth by the regulator’s forcing e¢cient treatment of defaulting debtors (and thereby
raising loan recovery).18 The e¢cient treatment of defaulting borrowers is implemented
either through outside intervention in the bank’s operations (for example, the regulator
running the bank or replacing the bank manager) or through transfer of the bank’s assets
to other agents or institutions (e.g., mergers with healthy banks, creation of bridge banks,
or bank liquidations).
Whereas the bene…t of intervention comes from the increase in bank value due to the
reversal of ine¢cient loan rollovers, costs of intervention policies arise from at least two
potential sources: lower bank asset values due to “…re-sale” conditions when banks are
liquidated; and losses in the asset values of good borrowers when their banks are closed.
Both types of costs have been cited in the literature. Dreyfus, Saunders, and Allen (1994)
and James (1991) note the possibility of depressed prices of a liquidated bank’s assets
due to the sale of these assets at “…re-sale” prices. Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001),
James, (1991), and Maileth and Mester, (1993) make reference to diminished asset values
of good borrowers due to a loss of “inside” information when the troubled bank is closed
or when its assets are transferred to another institution. Yet another potential source
of intervention costs a¤ecting good borrowers is invoked by Jordan (1998) and Peek and
Rosengreen (1995), who cite reductions in new loans to existing borrowers when troubled
banks are left in operation but must shrink their operations in order to meet capital-asset
1 8What is important for the model is the existence of a risky action that can be associated with “gambling
for resurrection” and that is halted with intervention. As Rajan (1994) notes, modeling banks’ choices of
risky loan rollovers versus less risky revelation of bad loans is formally equivalent to allowing banks to
choose between making excessively risky new loans versus safer loans in period 1. In a similar manner,
the bene…t of intervention cited here as the increase in bank net worth due to the reversal of loan rollovers
could be thought of more generally as increasing bank value due to the halting of all excessively risky
behavior.
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requirements. Intervention policies may also give rise to signi…cant external costs. It is
now well accepted that a bank’s …nancial distress may create systemic costs which could
be avoided by recapitalization and continuation of the troubled bank. Examples include
Rochet and Tirole (1996) and Flannery (1996), both of which concern interbank credit
markets.
All of the di¤ering types of intervention costs possess the characteristic that they are
increasing in the number of banks to which the intervention policy is applied. In addition,
several of these costs are likely to be convex in the number of banks to which intervention
is applied. For example, in the case of the systemic costs analyzed by Rochet and Tirole
(1996), while the failure of a single bank may decrease liquidity at a lender bank but may
not be su¢cient to render the lender bank insolvent, the simultaneous failure of several
borrower banks may well render the lender bank insolvent and thus a candidate itself for a
policy of intervention.19
Another example of convexity of intervention costs is given by the loss in the value
of bank assets due to depressed asset prices upon liquidation of the bank. Whereas the
forced sale of one bank’s real estate collateral might not have a signi…cant e¤ect on overall
real estate prices, the simultaneous sales of several banks’ real estate assets could cause a
general real-estate price decline.
Finally, the costs related to loss of …nance for good borrowers due to information losses
when their original lender bank fails are also likely to be convex in the number of failed
banks. Suppose, as in Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001), that the value of a loan transferred
from the original bank to a new lender is only a fraction ¯ of its value with the original
bank. This implies a proportional loss of (1 ¡ ¯) in the value of a displaced borrower. In
addition, if in order to extract ¯ of the displaced borrower’s value the new lenders must
also be banks (i.e., if arms-length lenders could not extract as much as ¯), then it is likely
that the fraction ¯ will decrease (and the per-borrower loss will increase) as the number of
failed banks increases.
More precisely, because of the limited size of banks’ trained personnel, the ability of a
given bank to take on and acquire information about a large number of new clients in a
short period of time is limited. The fewer the number of banks remaining in operation in the
1 9Obviously, failure of a bank that is large enough could cause its lenders to become insolvent. This
issue of “too-big-to-fail” is studied by Rochet and Tirole.
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economy and the greater the number of displaced borrowers searching for new …nance, the
less resources that a given bank can devote to any given displaced borrower; or equivalently,
the lower the probability that any given displaced borrower will be able to obtain new
…nance. Thus, if enough banks fail, the expected value of a displaced borrower’s assets will
fall below ¯ of its value with the original lender. The total loss in …rm values if all N banks
in an economy fail will then be greater than N times the loss in …rm values when only
one bank in the economy fails. Failure of a large proportion of the banks in the banking
system can thus result in signi…cant losses in …nance for good …rms, thereby provoking a
recession.20
3.3.1 Intervention cost function
The intervention cost function formalized here focuses on one of the convex costs described
above, namely the loss in asset values of good borrowers displaced from failing banks.21 For
expositional purposes I make a number of simplifying assumptions. First, good borrowers
(…rms with performing loans) are assumed to be evenly distributed across failing banks.
Second, a nonfailing bank is assumed to be able to expand its portfolio by a maximum
proprotion ¸ of the number of displaced borrowers of a failing bank and still recover ¯ of
the value of displaced borrowers’ loans. Acquiring displaced borrowers above this limit is
assumed (for simplicity) to result in zero recovery by the new bank for all borrowers exceed-
ing the limit. This situation can be thought of as one where, given the number of displaced
2 0Note that intervention costs are likely to be lower when the intervention policy consists of mergers
of troubled banks with healthier banks than bank closures. Importantly, however, the costs with mergers
are nonzero. (See James, 1991.) Moreover, if a large enough number of banks in the economy becomes
…nancially distressed, mergers of all the troubled banks with healthy banks will become di¢cult, if not
impossible. Regulators will have to resort to bank liquidations, which will give rise to convex costs. Thus,
even in economies where regulators traditionally respond to bank distress by merging distressed banks with
healthier ones, the costs of intervention become convex for a large enough number of distressed banks.
2 1The focus on losses in viable borrowers’ values is made both for modelling simplicity and for its
generality. Systemic costs relating to interbank loan markets such as those modeled by Rochet and Tirole
(1996) and Flannery (1996) apply only in economies where these markets are well developed and relatively
unrestricted. On the other hand, dependence of …rms on bank lending is quite general across economies;
even in economies with well developed …nancial markets, a substantial proportion of …rms relies heavily on
bank …nance.
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borrowers already taken on, bank personnel have no time to acquire any information about
any additional borrowers; therefore, recovery on additional loans is very low.
De…ne the following variables:
N = number of banks in the economy
i = number of banks to which intervention is applied
V = expected value per troubled bank of all good borrowers of the bank
¸ = proportion of the displaced borrowers of a failing bank for which a nonfailing
bank can recover ¯ of the value of assets
Let !(i; N) be the expected percentage loss in the value of a viable borrower displaced
from a bank to which intervention has been applied. Then !(¢)iV represents economy-wide
expected losses in displaced borrowers’ values when intervention is applied to i banks. The
functional form assumed for !(¢) generalizes assumptions made by Diamond and Rajan
(2000, 2001), who assume that the percentage loss in asset value of a displaced borrower
always equals (1 ¡ ¯); and Mailath and Mester (1993), who assume that all borrowers
displaced from closed banks lose their …nance.
The function !(¢) is de…ned by:
!(i; N) = 1¡ ¯ ; if ¸ > 0 and i· ¸(N ¡ i)
= 1¡ (¸(N ¡ i)
i
) ¢ ¯; if i > ¸(N ¡ i)
The term ¢¸(N¡i)i represents the proportion of displaced borrowers in the economy that
actually succeed in obtaining …nance from a new bank once all nonfailing banks have reached
their expansion limits; i.e., once i > ¸ ¢ (N ¡ i). Note that for ¸ < 1; the function !(¢) is
constant up to the critical value i = ¸(N¡ i), beyond which !(¢) becomes increasing in i:22
The value of !(¢) approaches one and the proportion of displaced borrowers that actually
obtain …nance goes to zero as i approaches the total number of banks in the economy. The
2 2For example, if ¸ = 1 and N = 5; two troubled banks may be successfully intervened with per-borrower
loss in value equal to 1¡¯: Once the number of troubled banks exceeds two, intervention creates additional
per borrower losses in displaced borrowers’ asset values.
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total loss in asset values of good borrowers when i = N equals NV: The function !(¢) is
illustrated in Figure 1.
According to the de…nition of !(¢); when ¯ = 0 or ¸ = 0; displaced borrowers lose
all of their …nance. This situation corresponds to the assumption made in Mailath and
Mester (1993). If ¸ = 1, then all displaced borrowers always …nd new …nance, and the
expected percentage loss in asset values of displaced borrowers always equals (1¡ ¯): This
corresponds to the assumption of Dianmond and Rajan (1999, 2000). The lower is ¯ and
the lower is ¸; the higher are the total losses in asset values of displaced borrowers due to
intervention.
Suppose that ¯ = 1 and that 0 < ¸ < 1:When ¯ = 1; new lender banks can recover
the entire value of displaced borrowers’ assets, as long as the number of displaced borrowers
taken on does not exceed the new lender banks’ expansion limits. That ¸ is …nite, however,
implies that nonfailing banks will be able to expand their portfolios only up to a limit.
Thus, when ¯ = 1 and 0 < ¸ < 1; there always exists a range of intervened banks for
which intervention would generate no losses in asset values of displaced borrowers; i.e., for
which !(i; N) = 0: However, for i large enough, losses in displaced borrowers’ asset values
become positive. For expositional purposes, I make the following assumptions.
Assumption 4: ¯ = 1:
Assumption 5: 0 < ¸ <1:
In addition to the losses in the value of displaced borrowers, there are two other cat-
egories of costs associated with intervention: (1) payments equal to the di¤erence in the
value of an insolvent bank’s liabilities and its assets; and (2) expected future deposit in-
surance liabilities for passive banks that remain undiscovered in period 1 (and, therefore,
to which intervention is not applied). The second category is identical to this category for
rescue policies: the expected liabilities of an undiscovered passive bank equal Z(®); which
was de…ned in Eqn. (3) above. The …rst category is also similar to the case discussed above
with respect to rescue, where active banks are still insolvent. That is, a bank to which in-
tervention is applied has its loan rollovers reversed; therefore, its expected net worth is
equal to what it would have been if the bank had been active with respect to its defaulting
loans. If the bank is still insolvent, the government will have to reimburse depositors in the
case of bank liquidation or subsidize the acquiring bank in the case of merger with another
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bank. The di¤erence between the value of the intervened bank’s liabilities and assets is
equal to max[0; (L ¡ I0 ¡ (1¡ ®)B ¡ ® eB)]; which is just equal to RA(®) de…ned in Eqn.
(2) above.
We may now de…ne total intervention costs. Suppose, …rst, that all M troubled banks
are passive and that d is the probability of discovering a passive bank. The number of
intervened banks is dM . Intervention costs are given by:
C Int(M;djP ass) = dM[!(dM;N) ¢ V ] + dM [RA(®)] + (1¡ d)M[Z(®)]: (6)
The …rst term on the right-hand side of (6) is the expected loss in value of displaced
good borrowers of intervened banks. Assumptions 4 and 5 guarantee that this loss is zero
for a range of values of dM “low enough.” The second term is the di¤erence between the
liabilities and assets of intervened banks that are insolvent. This term is zero if intervened
banks are no longer insolvent once their loan rollovers have been reversed. The third term
represents the expected future deposit insurance liabilities for undetected passive banks.
This term is identical to its counterpart in the rescue cost function.
Comparison of (6) with (4) reveals that if d = 0; costs are equal for both policies. In
addition, recall that for the case of rescue, total rescue costs are increasing in d for passive
banks; therefore, the regulator would prefer forbearance to rescuing any positive number of
passive banks. In order to avoid completely trivial results of the analysis, we need for the
regulator to prefer to intervene in some positive number of banks rather than to engage in
complete forbearance. The following assumption (motivated in the Appendix) guarantees
that C Int(N;M; djPass) is decreasing for some range of positive d:
Assumption 6: The regulator never prefers complete forbearance to intervening in
some positive number of passive banks; i.e., ® eB > q[L¡ I0 ¡ (1¡ ®)B]:
Suppose now that all troubled banks are active. The number of banks to which inter-
vention is applied is nowM . As was noted above for rescue, when active banks are solvent
there is no need to apply intervention. Thus, it is only if active banks are still insolvent
that intervention will actually be applied. Suppose that all M troubled banks are active
and insolvent. Then intervention costs are given by
CInt(M;djAct) =M [RA(®) + !(¢)V ]: (7)
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3.3.2 Rescue costs versus intervention costs
We may now compare the costs of rescue and intervention, given the behavior of troubled
banks.
Passive troubled banks. When all troubled banks are passive, the di¤erence in the
costs of intervention and rescue are given by
CInt(M;djPass) ¡ CRe s(M;djPass) = dM ¢ f[RA(®)¡RP(®)] +!(¢)V g : (8)
The term [RA(®) ¡RP (®)] is negative and represents the reduction in the regulator’s
costs with intervention relative to rescue due to the gains in bank values from reversing
loan rollovers. Given that RA(®) ¡ RP (®) is always negative, intervention costs will be
lower than rescue costs as long as !(¢) is small. This is guaranteed for some range of values
of dM by Assumptions 4 and 5.
A situation of too-many-to-fail (TMTF) is de…ned as one in which the number of in-
tervened banks dM becomes high enough so that CInt(¢)¡ CRe s(¢) becomes positive. The
motivation in the Appendix of Assumption 6 shows that in the case whereM · ¸(N ¡M ),
!(¢) = 0 for all d; therefore, in this case intervention will always be preferred to rescue for
passive banks. On the other hand, when M > ¸(N ¡M ); TMTF may be triggered for d
high enough. Inspection of (8) reveals that a necessary condition for TMTF to be triggered
is that V > [Rp(®) ¡ RA(®)]: This condition requires that the total asset values of the
good borrowers of a failing bank exceed the total gains in the bank’s value due to reversals
of risky loan rollovers. Given that a bank with a level of capital equal to eight percent of
risk-weighted assets need only have eight percent of its loans in default to become insolvent,
the case where the total value of good borrowers of the bank is greater than the gain in
the defaulting borrowers’ assets from reversing loan rollovers is quite realistic.
In order to allow for the possibility of a situation of TMTF, I make the following
assumption.
Assumption 7: V > [Rp(®) ¡RA(®)]:
The following lemma, which follows from the discussion in the Appendix and from
Assumption 7, identi…es the necessary conditions for TMTF to be triggered when banks
are passive.
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Lemma 1 Suppose that all troubled banks are passive. (i) IfM > ¸(N¡M ) and !(M;N)V >
[Rp(®) ¡ RA(®)], then there exists a value d¤(M ) such that !(d¤(M )M;N)V = [Rp(®) ¡
RA(®)] and for which TMTF is triggered. Intervention is less costly than rescue for d <
d¤(M ); and rescue is less costly than intervention for all d ¸ d¤(M ); (ii) If M · ¸(N¡M )
or if M > ¸(N ¡M ) and !(M;N)V · [Rp(®)¡ RA(®)]; then for all d > 0; intervention
is less costly than rescue.
The condition that !(M;N)V > [Rp(®) ¡RA(®)] requires that when d = 1; the total
loss in value of displaced borrowers with a policy of intervention will exceed the gain in
bank value due to reversals of loan rollovers with intervention. Rescue thus becomes less
costly than intervention for d high enough. Figure 2 illustrates case (i) of the lemma.
Active troubled banks. Comparison of the costs of intervention and rescue when
troubled banks are active gives
CInt(M;djAct)¡ CRe s(M;djAct) =M [!(M;N)V ]: (9)
Note that the termM [RA(®)]; which appeared in the costs for each policy, disappears when
the di¤erence in costs is taken. Note also that the right hand side of (9) is independent of
the value of d and is always nonnegative. This implies that when troubled banks are active
(and insolvent), rescue will always be weakly preferred to intervention and will be strictly
preferred if !(¢) is positive.
The result that the costs of rescue are always lower than intervention costs whenever
insolvent banks actively reveal their defaulting loans seems surprising. The extreme nature
of this result is in part an artifact of the model, which does not incorporate a moral hazard
e¤ect of bank rescues. The moral hazard e¤ect would imply that the regulator’s choice of
rescue would raise banks’ beliefs about the possibility of future rescues and therefore would
encourage them to make excessively risky loans in the future, possibly leading to a new
banking crisis. Incorporating a moral hazard e¤ect of rescue in the model would raise the
costs of rescue relative to intervention.
I do not include this e¤ect in the model because it would require introducing features
that would make the model intractable, such as more than two periods; a choice of new,
risky investment for banks in period 2, in addition to the rollover/bankruptcy decision with
respect to defaulting loans in period 1, etc. Moreover, even if these features were included,
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there could still arise situations in which the number of troubled banks is large enough so
that the costs arising from losses in …nance for displaced borrowers would become greater
than the moral hazard costs of rescue. Thus, including a moral hazard e¤ect in the model
would not eliminate the possibility of TMTF.
Although I do not explicitly model the moral hazard e¤ect, I take partial account of
this e¤ect in an indirect manner via the following assumption.
Assumption 8: For values of M for which CInt(¢jAct) ¡ CRe s(¢jAct) = 0, G chooses
intervention.
Assumption 8 implies that when troubled banks are active but insolvent, intervention
will be chosen for all values ofM for which !(M;N ) = 0: The following lemma summarizes
the discussion.
Lemma 2 Suppose that all troubled banks are active but insolvent. If M · ¸(N ¡ M );
intervention is preferred to rescue for all d. If M > ¸(N ¡ M ); rescue is preferred to
intervention for all d:
Lemma 2 states that when banks are active but insolvent, TMTF will be triggered
whenever the number of intervened banks causes the losses in the value of displaced bor-
rowers to become positive. This occurs for all M > ¸(N ¡ M ); since active banks are
costlessly identi…ed by the regulator. Note that when banks are active, the value of d has
no in‡uence on the value of !(¢) and on the regulator’s policy choice; therefore, it does not
enter the conditions of Lemma 2.
The discussion of this section demonstrates that the policy chosen by the regulator will
be a function of the following variables: the number M of troubled banks relative to the
total number N of banks in the economy; the fraction ® of banks’ portfolios in default;
the probability d of detecting pasive banks; and bank behavior with respect to defaulting
loans. The regulator will choose the policy which minimizes costs, given bank behavior
and given the number of discovered troubled banks. Lemmas 1 and 2 show that if the
number of troubled banks is small or if the regulator’s monitoring capacity is very weak,
then intervention will be the chosen policy. If the number of troubled banks becomes large
enough (and the monitoring capacity not too weak), then TMTF will be triggered and
bank rescues will occur.
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Yet, bank behavior with respect to defaulting loans is endogenous and is itself a func-
tion of the regulator’s expected policy choice. The next section examines the behavior of
troubled banks and the continuation equilibria induced by di¤ering values of d: In Section
4 I derive continuation equilibria under two assumptions: (1) ® is so high that all troubled
banks are insolvent even if they choose to be active; and (2) ® is low enough that troubled
banks can remain solvent if they choose to be active (although, as indicated by Assump-
tion 2, these banks will have negative expected net worth if they roll over their defaulting
loans). The …rst case may be thought of as one in which the banking crisis is severe, in
the sense that the level of …nancial distress among troubled banks is high. The second case
represents a less severe banking crises, or a banking crisis at an early stage.
In Section 5 I analyze the equilibrium (d, Action, Policy) by including the regulator’s
choice of d in period 0, assuming that the regulator takes account of the continuation
equilibrium induced in period 1 by d. As in Section 4 I …rst consider the case where all
troubled banks are insolvent, then I analyze the case where troubled banks can remain
solvent. The results of these sections illustrate how bank behavior di¤ers as a function
of the level of distress ® and how equilibrium outcomes also di¤er as a function of ®.
Finally, in Section 6 I discuss the general model where both “types” of distressed banks
exist: banks which are insolvent even if they are active and less distressed banks which can
remain solvent as long as they are active.
4 Continuation equilibria
4.1 Insolvent banks
In this subsection I assume that the proportion ® of banks’ portfolios in default is su¢ciently
high that all M banks with default will be insolvent even if they choose to actively reveal
and deal with their bad loans. Because distressed banks are insolvent, even if these banks
use bankruptcy for their defaulters, their expected earnings cannot cover their liabilities.
As noted above, however, these banks are nevertheless assumed to be liquid: if they roll
over their loans in period 1 and are not discovered, they are able to stay in operation during
period 1, and the banker will enjoy the private bene…t ½. Call the level of default ®b; where
the subscript b represents “bad” banks. The following assumption guarantees that active
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banks are insolvent.
Assumption 9: ¦A(®b) = I0 + (1 ¡ ®b)B + ®b ~B ¡ L < 0:
A continuation equilibrium has the form (Action, Policy; d). In order to characterize
continuation equilibria, I …rst derive banks’ actions given a particular policy, then I use
backward induction to identify the regulator’s choice of policy.
4.1.1 Best responses to monitoring and choice of policy
Intervention. Suppose that the policy is intervention. Application of intervention to a
bank will result in a utility level of zero for the banker. (It is shown in the Appendix that
it is optimal for the regulator to remove the banker’s private bene…t when intervention is
applied.) The expected utility to a passive banker is thus
U (PassjInt; d) = (1 ¡ d) ¢ fq[I0 + B ¡ L] + ½g: (10)
With probability (1 ¡ d) the passive bank is not detected; therefore, intervention is not
applied. In this case, with probability q rollover will succeed and the banker will receive a
monetary payo¤ of [I0+B¡L]: Given that the bank is not detected, the banker obtains the
private bene…t ½ whether or not rollover succeeds. With probability d the bank is detected,
and the banker’s utility is zero.
The expected utility for an active bank is given by U(ActjInt; d) = 0: This follows
from the fact that active banks are costlessly identi…ed by the regulator, and application
of intervention removes the banker’s private bene…t ½. Comparison of U (PassjInt; d) and
U(ActjInt;d) reveals that given a policy of intervention U (PassjInt; d) > U(ActjInt; d);
insolvent banks will choose passivity for any value of d.
Rescue. With rescue the amount of recapitalization given to the bank in period 1 is
RP (®b) = L ¡ I0 ¡ (1 ¡ ®b)B: Note that if the passive bank’s loan rollover fails, its net
worth in period 2, including the recapitalization will just equal zero. On the other hand, if
the passive bank’s loan rollover succeeds, the bank’s net worth will be strictly positive. In
each case the banker obtains the private bene…t ½:
The passive banker’s expected utility with rescue, then, is
Ub(P assjRes; d) = dfq[I0 + B ¡ L] + RP(®b) + ½g + (1 ¡ d)fq[I0+ B ¡ L] + ½g
= q[I0 +B ¡ L] + dRP(®b) + ½: (11)
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When the bank is active, it receives an amount of recapitalization that guarantees
that its net worth is zero in period 2. Therefore, Ub(ActjRes; d) = ½: Comparison of
Ub(PassjRes ; d) and Ub(ActjRe s; d) reveals that given a policy of rescue, the insolvent
bank will also choose passivity.
The following lemma summarizes the discussion.
Lemma 3 When all troubled banks are insolvent, these banks will choose passivity inde-
pendently of the regulator’s expected policy choice.
Lemma 3 implies that the regulator who minimizes costs has no power to induce in-
solvent banks to choose to be active with respect to defaulting loans. Namely, neither a
high value of d nor the threat of intervention exerts a disciplinary e¤ect on insolvent banks.
Yet, although insolvent banks always choose passivity, the motivation for this choice di¤ers
according to the regulator’s expected policy. When the expected policy is intervention, the
bank’s motivation for passivity is to avoid signalling its negative net worth, in order to
avoid losing the private bene…t from operating the bank. In contrast, when the expected
policy is rescue, the insolvent bank’s motivation for passivity is to gamble for resurrec-
tion. If gambling for resurrection were not possible (i.e., if loan rollovers were not riskier
than bankruptcy), the insolvent bank would be indi¤erent between being active and being
passive given a policy of rescue, since the banker’s utility would equal ½ in both cases.
4.1.2 Continuation equilibrium for insolvent banks
Given that insolvent banks always choose passivity, it su¢ces to determine the sign of the
RHS of (8) for a given value of d to determine the regulator’s policy choice: Lemma 1
guarantees that for any d there will be a range of M for which intervention is the optimal
choice. On the other hand, Lemma 1 implies that for any given d there exists an M high
enough so that TMTF is triggered. De…ne the critical value M ¤(d) such that [RP(®) ¡
RA(®)] = !(dM¤(d); N)V: For values ofM >M ¤(d); TMTF is triggered and the regulator’s
policy choice will be rescue. (Note that M ¤(d) > ¸(N ¡ M ).) It is clear that M ¤(¢) is a
decreasing function of d:
The following proposition follows immediately.
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Proposition 1 Suppose that all troubled banks are insolvent. For all d; there exists an
M¤(d) such that the continuation equilibrium when all troubled banks are insolvent is (Pas-
sivity, Intervention) for M 2 [0;M¤(d)]; and the continuation equilibrium is (Passivity,
Rescue) for M 2 (M¤(d); N ] .
Proposition 1 suggests that it may be useful to make a distinction between the severity
of a banking crisis and how widespread the crisis is. The severity of the banking crisis refers
to the level of solvency (®) of the a¤ected banks. How widespread the crisis is refers to
the number M of banks that are a¤ected relative to the number of banks in the economy.
A banking crisis becomes systemic when the crisis is severe and widespread. Proposition
1 implies that given a value of d; when the banking crisis is severe banks will always roll
over their defaulting loans (or otherwise engage in excessive risk-taking). The regulator
will apply intervention as long as the banking crisis is not systemic (i.e., as long as a large
enough number of banks are not a¤ected). When the crisis becomes systemic, TMTF is
triggered, and the regulator opts for bank rescues.
4.2 Solvent but troubled banks
Suppose now that banks with bad debt have a level ®g of default low enough that they are
able to remain solvent if they are active. Hence, banks with loan defaults are …nancially
distressed but not insolvent. Assumption 2, however, implies that if banks with loan
defaults choose to be passive, their expected net worth is negative.
Let ®g represent the proportion of banks’ portfolios in default, where the subscript g
represents “good” banks. Because an active bank’s expected net worth is positive, it will
not have a motivation to choose passivity in order to hide negative net worth. The only
possible motives for passivity are either to take advantage of the deposit insurance put
option (i.e., to gamble for resurrection) or to trigger a situation of TMTF.
The following assumption guarantees that active banks are solvent.
Assumption 10: ¦A = I0 + (1¡ ®g)B +®g eB ¡ L > 0:
In order for a troubled bank ever to choose passivity, gambling for resurrection must
be valuable to the bank. Gambling for resurrection can only be valuable to a troubled
“good” bank if the expected gain from gambling is greater than the increase in expected
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bank net worth from using bankruptcy instead of rollover for defaulting debtors. The gain
from gambling derives from the banker’s limited liability; if loan rollovers fail, the banker
is not liable for uncovered deposit liabilities. If loan rollovers succeed, the bank’s net worth
is higher than it would have been had it used bankruptcy for defaulting debtors. The
following de…nition gives the parameter values that are necessary for troubled banks ever
to choose passivity.
De…nition 1: Gambling for resurrection is valuable to the good bank if
q[I0 + B ¡ L] > I0 + (1¡ ®g)B +®g eB ¡ L: (12)
The left-hand side of (12) is the banker’s expected monetary payo¤ in the case of rollover.
Because of limited liability, this value is greater than expected bank net worth with rollover.
The right-hand side is the banker’s monetary payo¤ when the bank uses bankruptcy. (This
value equals bank net worth when the bank is active.) The condition in (12) can be
reexpressed as
(1¡ q)L > [I0 ¡ (1¡ ®g)B +®g eB] ¡ q[I0 +B];
which implies that the decrease in expected liabilities exceeds the loss in the banker’s
expected monetary payment when the bank chooses passivity relative to bankruptcy. In
other words, the deposit insurance put option is valuable to the bank. In order to allow for
the possibility that good banks choose passivity, I make the following assumption.
Assumption 11: Gambling for resurrection is valuable to good banks.23
4.2.1 Solvent bank best responses to monitoring and choice of policy
Intervention. When the policy is intervention, the expected utility to a passive banker is
Ug(PassjInt; d) = (1¡ d) ¢ fq[I0+ B ¡ L] + ½g; (13)
which is identical to Ub(PassjInt; d) in the previous section. The expected utility of an
active banker is given by
Ug(ActjInt) = I0 + (1¡ ®g)B +®g eB ¡ L+ ½: (14)
2 3An example of parameter values that satisfy both Assumptions 6 and 11 are ® = :4, B = 1000;eB = 500; q = :3; I0 = 150; and L = 900:
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Note that Ug(ActjInt) is independent of d; and Ug(P assjInt; d) is decreasing in d: As-
sumption 11 implies that Ug(PassjInt; d) > Ug(ActjInt) for d = 0: On the other hand,
for d = 1, Ug(ActjInt) > Ug(PassjInt; d) = 0: Thus, there exists a critical value ed such
that Ug(PassjInt; ed) = Ug(ActjInt): The bank will choose passivity for d 2 [0; ed) and
bankruptcy for d 2 [ ed; 1]:
Rescue. When the policy is rescue, the passive banker’s expected utility is
Ug(PassjRes ; d) = dfq[I0 + B ¡ L] +RP(®g)] + ½g+ (1¡ d)fq[I0 + B ¡ L] + ½g;
= q[I0 + B ¡ L] + dRP (®g) + ½: (15)
The active banker’s expected utility is
Ug(ActjRes) = I0 + (1¡ ®g)B + ®g eB ¡ L+ ½:
Note that Ug(ActjRes) = Ug(ActjInt); since the active bank remains solvent and thus
does not receive any recapitalization with a policy of rescue. Assumption 11 implies that
Ug(PassjRes ; d) > Ug(ActjRes) for all d; therefore, the good bank always chooses passivity
when the regulator’s expected policy choice is rescue. The following lemma summarizes
the behavior of good banks.
Lemma 4 Suppose that troubled banks are not insolvent. Then, (i) given a policy of inter-
vention, there exists a value ed such that troubled banks will choose passivity for d 2 [0; ed) and
bankruptcy for d 2 ( ed; 1]; (ii) given a policy of rescue, troubled banks will choose passivity
for all d:
This lemma shows that setting a high value of d, combined with the threat of interven-
tion, can discipline good banks to be active.
4.2.2 Continuation equilibrium for solvent banks
Statement (i) of Lemma 4 suggests that in order to characterize continuation equilibria it
is necessary to consider separately the cases where d < ed and where d > ed:
Case 1: d · ed
In this case, good banks will choose passivity independently of the regulator’s policy
choice. Thus, this case resembles the analysis of insolvent banks in the previous section.
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In particular, for any d implied by this case, there exists a critical value M ¤(d) < N such
that the costs of intervention become higher than the costs of rescue for M > M ¤(d). We
may restate Proposition 1 for this case, taking into account that the critical value M¤(d)
for which TMTF is triggered di¤ers for the banks in this section and the insolvent banks
that were analyzed in the previous section.
Lemma 5 Suppose that M banks are troubled but solvent. For all d < ed; there ex-
ists an M ¤g (d) such that the continuation equilibrium is (Passivity, Intervention) for M 2
[0;M¤g (d)); and (Passivity, Rescue) for M 2 [M ¤g (d); N ] .
As in Section 4.1 the critical value M ¤g (d) is the value of M for which the sign of (8)
becomes positive. Note that for good banks RA(®g) = 0. Also, RP(®g) < RP(®b): This
implies that the critical value of M at which TMTF is triggered is greater for the banks
analyzed in this section than for the banks analyzed in Section 4.1.
Case 2: d > ed:
For values of d in this case, troubled banks will choose to be active if they believe that
intervention will be the regulator’s policy choice and passive if they believe that rescue will
be chosen. When troubled banks are active, they remain solvent; therefore, in this case
intervention is not actually applied to any bank, and the regulator’s policy cost is zero.
In order to fully characterize the continuation equilibria, we must compare the costs
of intervention and of rescue when banks are passive. The di¤erence in costs between
intervention and rescue is given by (8). As for Case 1, it is possible to show that there
exists a critical valueM ¤g (d) such that when all banks are passive, intervention is preferred
to rescue for M 2 [0;M¤g (d)); and rescue is preferred to intervention for M 2 [M ¤g (d); N ]:
However, we know that in the range of d implied by this case, banks will choose to be active
when the expected policy choice is intervention. Thus, for d > ed and M 2 [0;M ¤g (d)], the
continuation equilibriun is given by (Active, Intervention).
When d > ed and M > M ¤g (d); a coordination problem arises, and there exist two
continuation equilibria: (Active, Intervention) and (Passive, Rescue). Namely, if troubled
banks believe that other troubled banks are choosing to be active and that too few passive
banks will be discovered to trigger TMTF, then the continuation equilibrium will be (Active,
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Intervention).24 In contrast, if a troubled bank believes that all other troubled banks are
choosing passivity, then the troubled bank will also have the incentive to choose passivity,
since by de…nition of M > M ¤g (d); the number dM of discovered troubled banks will be
high enough to trigger TMTF. In this case the continuation equilibrium will be (Passive,
Rescue). Which continuation equilibrium actually occurs will depend upon troubled banks’
beliefs about the strategies of other troubled banks.
The following proposition summarizes the discussion of continuation equilibria.
Proposition 2 Suppose that M banks are troubled but solvent. (i) If d < ed; the continu-
ation equilibrium is (Passive, Intervention) for M 2 [0;M¤g (d)] and (Passive, Rescue) for
M 2 (M ¤g (d); N ]; (ii) If d ¸ ed and M 2 [0;M ¤g (d)]; the continuation equilibrium is (Active,
Intervention); (iii) if d ¸ ed and M 2 (M ¤g (d); N ]; there are two continuation equilibria:
(Active, Intervention) and (Passive, Rescue).
Statements (i) and (iii) of Proposition 2 demonstrate that TMTF may be triggered even
in a banking crisis that is not initially severe. In contrast, statements (i) and (ii) show that
if the banking crisis is not too widespread (i.e.,M is low enough), d can serve a disciplinary
role: a high enough value of d combined with a threat of intervention motivates troubled
banks to become active. Even when the number M of troubled banks is high, a systemic
banking crisis can still be avoided as long as troubled banks are active with respect to their
defaulting loans. However, statement (iii) demonstrates that if the number of troubled
banks is high and banks choose to be passive, the passivity can generate a banking crisis
in which TMTF is triggered. In this situation the coordination problem created by the
prospect of TMTF has led to an increase in bank passivity.
5 Allowing for the ex ante choice of monitoring qual-
ity
Section 4 has analyzed bank behavior and the regulator’s policy choice in period 1, given
some monitoring quality d: Suppose now that the regulator can anticipate the onset of a
2 4Recall that although active banks are costlessly identi…ed by the regulator, there is no need to apply
any policy to these banks.
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banking crisis (or the probability of onset) as well as the number M of banks that are
likely to be a¤ected by a crisis. How might he design ex ante regulatory institutions in
light of the likelihood of a crisis and its outcome? In other words, how might the choice of
supervisory capability d depend upon the likelihood and nature of a crisis?
In this section I allow the regulator to choose the ex ante monitoring capability d in
period 0, taking account of the continuation equilibrium that will be induced in period 1.
The regulator knows the value of M (that is, how widespread the banking crisis will be);
however, he does not know which particular banks will be a¤ected in a crisis.25 The regu-
lator chooses d to minimize the expected total costs (monitoring costs plus ex post policy
costs) associated with loan defaults on banks’ balance sheets, subject to the constraint that
the policy choice in period 1 must be subgame perfect.
The optimal choice of d can be found as follows. For each policy–intervention and
rescue–…nd the optimal value of d consistent with that policy being subgame perfect in
period 1, taking into account troubled banks’ best responses in expectation of the policy.
The requirement that the policy be subgame perfect restricts the range of d over which the
optimization is performed for that policy. The optimization exercise yields two candidate
equilibria: (dR, Action, Rescue) and (dI; Action, Intervention), where Action represents
banks’ best responses to the policy. Comparison of expected total costs for each candidate
equilibrium identi…es the lowest-cost candidate, and this candidate represents the unique
equilibrium.
As in Section 4, I …rst consider the case of a severe crisis, where all troubled banks are
insolvent; then I consider the case of a less severe crisis, where troubled banks can remain
solvent. Before analyzing these cases, however, it is possible to derive two general results.
The …rst result relates to equilibria involving the policy of rescue.
Lemma 6 The regulator prefers engaging in complete forbearance to being in a situation
of TMTF. That is, any equilibrium involving the policy of rescue has the following form:
(0, Passivity, Rescue).
2 5Although the analysis of this section assumes that the regulator knows M with certainty, a similar (but
more complicated) analysis could be undertaken under the assumption that the regulator does not know
M but has a prior over this variable. The choice of d in the latter case would be that which minimizes
expected costs, where the expectation is taken over M: This more complicated analysis would not produce
qualitatively di¤erent results.
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Proof: See Appendix.
Lemma 6 makes use of two results from earlier sections. First, any continuation equi-
librium involving the policy of rescue will induce banks to choose passivity. (Recall that
insolvent banks always choose passivity, and solvent banks choose passivity if the expected
policy is rescue.) Second, when d = 0; rescue is a subgame perfect policy. This observa-
tion follows from the fact that intervention and rescue policy costs are equal for d = 0:
CRe s(M; 0jPass) = CInt(M; 0jPass): Finally, the result stated in the lemma implies that
the value d = 0 yields lower expected total costs than any positive value of d for which
rescue is the subgame perfect policy. This derives from the observation that both moni-
toring costs g(¢) and ex post rescue costs CRe s(M;djPass) are increasing in d: A general
conclusion that can be drawn from the lemma is that no equilibrium will involve a positive
value of d and a rescue policy. Any equilibrium in which d takes on positive value will
involve a policy of intervention.
A second general result relates to equilibria with intervention. Suppose that banks are
passive. Suppose, further, that M is high enough so that TMTF can be triggered for some
value d¤(M ): Then, intervention costs are lower than rescue costs for all d 2 [0; d¤(M )];and
rescue costs are lower than intervention costs for d 2 [d¤(M ); 1]: Let dI be the solution to
min
d2[0;d¤(M)]C(d; Int) = g(d) + C
Int(M;djPass): (16)
It is possible to show that dI lies in the range of d for which CInt(M;djP ass) is decreasing
in d:26
Lemma 7 Let bd be the value of d such that CInt(M;djPass) reaches a minimum. Let dI
to be the solution to (16). Then 0 · dI < bd < d¤(M):
Proof: See Appendix.
Lemma 7 implies that in any equilibrium of the form (dI; Passive, Intervention) the
value of d will never be set at a value close to that which would trigger TMTF, since the
intervention cost function CInt(M;djPass) is increasing in d around d¤(M).
2 6Note that the speci…c value of dI will be a function of M:
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5.1 Equilibrium when all troubled banks are insolvent
Recall that insolvent banks choose passivity independently of the regulator’s policy. This
fact, together with Lemmas 6 and 7 imply that there are two candidate equilibria: (0,
Passive, Rescue) and (dI; Passive, Intervention), where dI solves (16). A question that
needs to be considered is whether dI is always strictly positive, or whether there are some
parameter values for which the regulator might choose dI = 0. The following lemma
states that dI will be strictly positive as long as the marginal cost of establishing a small
monitoring capacity is not too large.
Lemma 8 Suppose that all troubled banks are insolvent. Let bd be the value of d 2 [0; 1] at
which CInt(M;djPass) reaches a minimum in d. Let dI be the solution to (16). Then, (i)
if g0(0) ¸ M[Z(®)¡RA(®)]; dI = 0; (ii) if g0(0) <M [Z(®) ¡RA(®)]; then 0 < dI < bd:
Proof: See Appendix.
Condition (i) of the lemma states that dI will only be set to zero if the cost of establishing
even a small positive detection probability is very high; speci…cally, this cost must be
greater than the total gain in bank value from reversing loan rollovers relative to undetected
passivity. If the marginal cost of implementing a positive monitoring capability d is not
this high, then dI will be strictly positive.
Note that when dI = 0; the equilibrium (dI;Passive, Intervention) is identical to (0,
Passive, Rescue), since when the regulator undertakes no monitoring at all, he does not
discover any passive banks and applies neither intervention or rescue to any bank. It is
now possible to characterize the equilibrium when troubled banks are insolvent.
Proposition 3 Suppose that all troubled banks are insolvent. (i) If g0(0) ¸ M [Z(®) ¡
RA(®)]); then the regulator engages in complete forbearance, and the equilibrium is (0,
Passive,¢); (ii) If g 0(0) < M [Z(®) ¡ RA(®)]; then the equilibrium is (dI , Passive, Inter-
vention), where 0 < dI < bd and bd is the value of d such that CInt(M;djPass) reaches a
minimum.
Proposition 3 states that if the marginal cost of establishing a low monitoring capacity
is not too high, then the unique equilibrium when all troubled banks are insolvent is to
set a positive value of d and to apply intervention to all discovered passive banks. If the
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marginal cost of establishing even a low monitoring capacity is very high, then the regulator
will engage in complete forbearance. In this case d = 0 and no bank is explicitly intervened
or recapitalized; all insolvent banks are allowed to continue in operation, and the regulator
will face future expected deposit insurance liabilities for banks whose loan rollovers fail.
At …rst glance Proposition 3 may appear to suggest that TMTF will never be triggered
in a severe banking crisis. This seems to run counter to observed practice, where it is
precisely in severe, widespread banking crises that regulators often decide to resort to bank
rescues. The proposition, however, does not rule out this event. It suggests only that if,
ex ante, regulators accurately anticipate the risk of a severe banking crisis, they will avoid
establishing bank supervisory regulations that are so stringent as to cause regulators to
…nd themselves later in a position of having to rescue the entire banking sector. Stringent
supervisory rules (a high monitoring capability) are costly to implement and will have
no disciplinary e¤ect on banks in a severe banking crisis. This does not imply, however,
that bank rescues will never occur. In fact, Proposition 1 of Section 4.1 suggests that if the
regulator has not accurately anticipated the banking crisis at the point at which supervisory
quality d is established, then TMTF may be triggered once a crisis occurs, and troubled
banks will be rescued if enough banks are troubled.
Note that the equilibrium level of monitoring dI depends upon M, or how widespread
the banking sector problems are. A comparative statics question of interest is the e¤ect
on the dI of an increase in M: One corollary that follows immediately from Proposition
3 is that if the increase in M is large enough for TMTF to be triggered at the original
equilibrium level of dI, then the new equilibrium value of d will be lower. On a more
general level, however, the e¤ect on dI of an increase in M is uncertain. On the one hand,
an increase in M would be expected to increase d since the marginal gain from increased
monitoring of banks and reversals of loan rollovers increases. On the other hand, if M is
high enough so that the losses of displaced borrowers are positive, an increase in M would
be expected to exert a negative e¤ect on d; since marginal gains from more intervention are
reduced by the greater losses of displaced borrowers. The relative strengths of these two
e¤ects will determine the ultimate sign of the change in dI: One case where the e¤ect on
dI of an increase in M would be unambigously positive is that where M 2 [0;¸(N ¡M )]:
Losses of displaced borrowers, !(¢); equal zero for all values of M in this case; therefore,
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an increase in M will cause an increase in dI : The following proposition summarizes the
discussion.
Proposition 4 Suppose that all troubled banks are insolvent. The equilibrium value dI
may increase or decrease with an increase in M:
Proof: See Appendix.
5.2 Equilibrium when all troubled banks are solvent
We now analyze the regulator’s period-0 choice of d when troubled banks are not insolvent.
Because the possibility of TMTF creates a coordination problem among troubled banks,
it is necessary to distinguish between the case where TMTF cannot be triggered and the
case where TMTF can be triggered.
Case 1: No possibility of TMTF. Since intervention is less costly than rescue for all
d; it su¢ces to identify the optimal value of d given a policy of intervention. Yet, because
bank behavior changes at the critical value ed; it is necessary to compare the solutions to
two optimization problems. The …rst is
min
d2(0;ed]C(d; IntjPass) = g(d) + CInt(M;djPass): (17)
The solution to this problem resembles that of (16) above. The solution, which I label dI1;
is described by Lemmas 7 and 8 above. In particular, if g0(0) is not too large, dI1 will be
strictly positive but situated in a region where C Int(¢jPass) is decreasing in d.
The second optimization problem is given by
min
d2[ed;1]C(d; IntjAct) = g(d); (18)
where we recall that given d ¸ ed and a policy of intervention, troubled banks will choose
to be active, in which case the intervention policy is not actually applied to any bank. It is
clear that the costs in the above problem are increaing in d; therefore, the solution to this
problem is dI2 = ed: The following lemma summarizes the candidate equilibria in this case.
Lemma 9 Suppose that troubled banks are solvent. When the value ofM is low enough that
TMTF cannot be triggered for any d, the equilibrium will be determined by minfg( ed); [g(dI1)+
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CInt(M;dI1jPass)]g; where dI1 solves (17). If the …rst term in the brackets is lower, the equi-
librium will be ( ed; Active, Intervention). If the second term is lower, the equilibrium will
be (dI1, Passive, Intervention).
Note that, in principal, dI1 may be equal to ed: This would be the case if the solution to
(17) were a corner solution. The case of greater interest for this paper, however, is that
where dI1 is an interior solution. In this case ed > dI1, and the equilibrium will only involveed if the reduction in ex post policy costs due to the disciplinary e¤ect of setting a higher
value of d o¤sets the increase in monitoring costs from a higher monitoring level. In this
case the regulator increases d beyond the point where the marginal increase in monitoring
cost equals the marginal bene…t from increased intervention in passive banks.
Lemma 9 shows that if an increase in supervisory quality to the point of deterring
passive behavior is not too costly, then the regulator will set the monitoring quality ed in
order to discipline banks and to avoid a crisis. On the other hand, if setting such a high
supervisory quality is very costly, then the regulator will set the lower quality dI1 and apply
intervention to discovered troubled banks.
Case 2: TMTF possible. As was noted above, given any M in this case, there exists
a critical value d¤(M ) such that when banks are passive, intervention will be less costly
than rescue for d < d¤(M ) and rescue will be less costly than intervention for d ¸ d¤(M ).
Yet, because of the potential change in bank behavior at ed; we must distinguish between
two subcases: (a) d¤(M ) · ed and (b) d¤(M ) > ed:
Case 2a: d¤(M ) · ed:
In this case rescue is less costly than intervention for d = ed; therefore, this case cor-
responds to that described in statement (iii) of Proposition 2, in which the value ed may
induce two continuation equilibria: Namely, if banks choose to be passive, the continua-
tion equilibrium at ed will be (Passive, Rescue), whereas if banks choose to be active, the
continuation equilibrium will be (Active, Intervention). Thus, whether ed serves a discipli-
nary role will depend upon banks’ beliefs, which determine their actions and the particular
continuation equilibrium that will occur with ed.
Suppose that the regulator believes that ed will induce the continuation equilibrium
(Active, Intervention). Then, in terms of bank behavior this situation resembles that of
Case 1, in which banks will choose passivity for d < ed, and they will become active at ed.
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(Note that we can use Lemma 6 to rule out possibility of an equilibrium of the form (d;
Passive, Rescue) with d ¸ d¤(M )). The following lemma states describes the candidate
equilibrium in this case.
Lemma 10 Suppose that troubled banks are solvent and that M is high enough that TMTF
may be triggered for d¤(M ) < ed. Then, when the regulator believes that ed will induce the
continuation equilibrium (Active, Intervention), the equilibrium will take the form described
in Lemma 9.
Now suppose that the regulator believes that ed will induce the continuation equilibrium
(Passive, Rescue). In this case ed has lost its disciplinary power, and troubled banks will
always have the incentive to choose passivity independently of the expected policy. (Recall
that, given d < ed banks choose passivity, and given a policy of rescue, troubled banks
choose passivity for all d.) This case then becomes similar to the case of insolvent banks,
and the equilibrium is described by Proposition 3.
Case 2b: d¤(M ) > ed
In this case TMTF is not triggered at ed; the regulator can credibly use intervention anded to discipline banks. Thus, this case is similar to that of Case 1. The equilibrium in this
case is described by Lemma 9.
We may now characterize the equilibrium.
Proposition 5 Suppose that troubled banks are solvent. (i) Suppose that the following
conditions hold: M is high enough so that TMTF is triggered at d¤(M ); d¤(M ) · ed;
and the regulator believes that the continuation equilibrium induced by ed will be (Passive,
Rescue). Then, the euqilibrium is given by (dI1, Passive, Intervention), where dI1 solves
mind2(0;ed]C(d; IntjP ass) = g(d) + CInt(M;djPass): (ii) If the conditions of (i) do not
hold, the equilibrium will be determined by minfg( ed); [g(dI1) + C Int(M;dI1jPass)]g. If the
…rst term in the brackets is lower, the equilibrium will be ( ed; Active, Intervention). If the
second term is lower, the equilibrium will be (dI1, Passive, Intervention).
Proposition 5 implies that when the numberM of troubled banks is so low that TMTF
can never be triggered or when TMTF can be triggered but the monitoring level ed still
induces banks to become active, the equilibrium will be either (dI1; Passive, Intervention)
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or ( ed; Active, Intervention), where dI1 · ed. In contrast, when TMTF can be triggered for
values of d less than ed and when ed loses its disciplinary power due to the coordination
problem (i.e., when banks will choose passivity when d = ed in the expectation of triggering
TMTF), then the equilibrium will be (dI1; Passive, Intervention). The regulator will main-
tain d at the lower level in order to avoid TMTF. This proposition implies that supervisory
quality is never higher when banks’ actions can trigger TMTF than when they cannot,
and supervisory quality may be strictly lower in the former situation. If in the absence of
TMTF the regulator would set a value of d to discipline banks, he now may soften banking
regulations in order to avoid a situation of TMTF. Troubled banks will choose passivity in
response to the softened banking regulations; however, the regulator will apply intervention
to the passive banks that are detected.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
Sections 4 and 5 have considered two versions of the model: one where all troubled banks
are insolvent and the other where all troubled banks can remain solvent if they are active
with respect to their defaulting loans. Insolvent banks always choose passivity with respect
to their defaulting loans. In equilibrium, the regulator will choose the optimal value of d;
given passivity on the part of troubled banks, and apply intervention to all detected passive
banks.
Solvent but troubled banks will be passive with respect to their defaulting loans if d
is low enough or if they expect rescue to be the policy chosen by the regulator. However,
if d is high enough and the policy of intervention is credible for high d; troubled banks
will choose to be active. In this case the regulator may opt for a value of d that is higher
than the value which equalizes the marginal cost of greater monitoring and the marginal
bene…t of increased detection of passive banks. The higher value of d disciplines troubled
banks and induces them to become active. However, the high value of d may also create a
coordination problem if enough banks are troubled. If when all banks decide to be passive
at this value of d, rescue would be less costly than intervention, the regulator may be
drawn into a situation of TMTF. If the regulator believes that this will happen, he will not
choose the high value of d in period 0; rather, he will lower d to a level that guarantees
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that TMTF cannot be triggered by banks’ passivity. Even though in this case banks are
sure to choose passivity, the regulator can implicitly commit to applying intervention to all
detected passive banks.
A question of interest is how the results would change with a more general model in
which some troubled banks are insolvent but others are solvent. (In addition to the previous
assumption that the regulator knows the number of troubled banks M, we would add the
assumption that the regulator knows the ratio of insolvent to solvent troubled banks.)
The behavior of insolvent banks would not change in the general version of the model:
an insolvent banker’s utility would always be higher with passivity than with bankruptcy.
Similarly, the best response of solvent, troubled banks would still be to choose passivity
for low values of d or whenever the expected policy is rescue, but to become active for
high values of d (d ¸ ed); provided that intervention is the expected policy choice. What
would likely change is the regulator’s ability to discipline troubled solvent banks by setting
d = ed: For example, suppose that the proportion of insolvent to solvent troubled banks is
high. Consider a value of M and a value of d such that d > d¤(M). Suppose, in addition,
that d¤(M ) < ed. If the number of troubled solvent banks is so low relative to the number
of insolvent banks that TMTF would still be triggered (due to the passivity of insolvent
banks) even if the solvent banks were to choose to be active, then the troubled solvent
banks will choose passivity in response to ed: TMTF could thus be triggered for a larger
range of parameter values in the general model than in the less general version; therefore,
the equilibrium would involve the regulator setting more often a low value of d in order to
avoid the triggering of TMTF.
How do the predictions of the model …t with reality? Section 1 cited a number of
examples of banking crises in which bank rescues have been adopted, primarily in response
to the perception by regulators that the crisis was systemic. Propositions 1 and 2 of Section
4 describe these cases, where as a result of the large number of banks that are troubled,
the expected costs of closing the banks exceed the costs of bank rescues.
Japan and the U.S. o¤er a di¤erent type of experience. In both of these countries
regulators responded to the onset of crisis by softening banking regulation. One possible
interpretation of the regulators’ response (Boot and Thakor, 1993, and Kane, 1990) is that
regulators acted in their own self interest, engaging in forbearance in the hope that banks’
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…nancial states would improve and that the regulators’ ability to properly supervise banks
would not be brought into question. Another possible explanation can be obtained with a
slightly modi…ed version of the model of this paper. Although the regulator’s choice of d
has been modeled as occurring in period 0, prior to the onset of a crisis, it is possible to
expand the model to allow for a relaxation of d in period 1. Note …rst that in period 1 the
cost associated with having established the monitoring level d in period 0 is sunk. If upon
perceiving the onset of a crisis, the regulator believes that the detection probability is so
high that many banks will be discovered to be troubled and TMTF will be triggered, and
if the regulator can costlessly relax banking regulation or reduce the quality of monitoring
(e.g., by relaxing the de…nition of bank solvency), then the regulator will do so in order
to lower ex post policy costs. The outcome will be that fewer troubled banks are detected
and intervention will be applied to those that are.27
Finally, it is often observed that in developing and transition economies, banking regu-
lations are weak. This would seem to aggravate banking sector problems in these countries,
which are already vulnerable to crises.28 Yet, the model of this paper suggests that if regu-
lators anticipate a high probability of a banking crisis, the total expected costs associated
with defaulting loans on banks’ balance sheets may actually be lower if a low enough mon-
itoring capability is set, so that regulators avoid being trapped in the situation of having
to bail out the entire banking sector.
2 7An alternative explanation put forth by Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) regarding U.S. regulators’
relaxation of solvency regulations in the face of the S&L crisis was that the budget available to the regulators
was insu¢cient to cover the costs of so many S&L liquidations. Relaxing solvency requirements allowed
the regulators to close fewer S&Ls and avoid having to request more money from the U.S. Congress. This
type of regulatory budget constraint could also easily be added to the model of this paper.
2 8Caprio and Honohan (1999) note the increased vulnerability to banking crises in developing relative
to industrialized economies and attribute it to aggregate volatility and to increased political interference
in bank lending. See Filer et al (1999) and Mitchell (2001) for a discussion of the added vulnerability of
transition economies to banking crises.
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7 Appendix
Motivation for Assumption 6.
The regulator will prefer some intervention to complete forbearance if costs of inter-
vention decline for at least some range of positive d: Assumptions 4 and 5 guarantee that
there exists a range of values of dM for which !(¢) = 0. A necessary condition, then, for
intervention costs to decline for some positive range of dM is that RA(®) < Z(®), or
max[0; (L¡ I0 ¡ (1¡ ®)B ¡ ® eB)] < (1¡ q)[L¡ I0 ¡ (1¡ ®)B]: (19)
Note that this condition is automatically satis…ed if banks that have been discovered and
had their loan rollovers reversed are solvent. If the banks are still insolvent, this condition
translates into the requirement that
® eB > q[L¡ I0 ¡ (1¡ ®)B]:
This is Assumption 6 in the text.
Assumptions 4-6 imply that for any M , intervention costs are initially declining for
low values of d but may begin to increase with d if !(¢) becomes large enough. We may
distinguish between two cases.
Case 1: M · ¸(N ¡M), which implies that !(¢) = 0 for all d.
In this case the number of troubled banks is low enough relative to the total number
of banks in the system, and the capacity of nonfailing banks to take on new borrowers is
high enough, so that there are never any losses in the value of good borrowers. Displaced
borrowers of failing banks will always be able to obtain new …nance at a nonfailing bank.
This implies that intervention costs CInt(N;M; djP ass) are declining for all d > 0:
Case 2: M > ¸(N ¡M ):
In this case external costs become positive for d high enough. In addition, as d in-
creases, if the value of !(dM;N)V becomes high enough relative to Z(®) ¡RA(®); then
CInt(N;M; djPass) will turn increasing in d.
Proof that regulator always …res the bank manager with intervention.
We need to prove that it is optimal for the regulator to replace the bank manager (i.e.,
set ½ = 0) with a policy of intervention. Suppose, to the contrary, that intervention involves
only reversal of loan rollovers, and the bank manager is not replaced. Then, it is possible
to show that the bank will always prefer passivity to being active.
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Insolvent banks:
When the banker is not replaced with intervention, her utility if she is passive becomes
U (PassjInt; d) = (1 ¡ d) ¢ fq[I0 + B ¡ L]g+ ½:
This utility is greater than the utility in the bank manager is active, in which case
U(ActjInt; d) = ½:
The banker clearly prefers to be passive. So, in the case where all troubled banks are
insolvent, allowing the bank manager to continue operating the bank with a policy of
intervention does not induce troubled banks to choose to be active.
Solvent banks:
If the banker is not replaced with intervention, her utility if she is passive is
U(PassjInt; d) = (1¡ d) ¢ fq[I0+ B ¡ L]g + d[I0 + (1 ¡ ®g)B + ®g eB ¡ L] + ½: (20)
The banker’s utility if she is active is
U (ActjInt; d) = I0 + (1¡ ®g)B + ®g eB ¡ L+ ½ (21)
By Assumption 11, q[I0 + B ¡ L]> I0 + (1 ¡ ®g)B + ®g eB ¡ L; therefore,
U(PassjInt;d) > I0+ (1 ¡®g)B + ®g eB ¡ L] + ½ = U(ActjInt; d):
The solvent banker would also choose passivity given a policy of intervention.
Proof of Lemma 6:
Consider the optimal value of d given that TMTF has been triggered. This value is the
solution to
min
d2[d¤(M);1] g(d) + C
Re s(d;M jP ass):
Since both terms are increasing in d, the solution to this problem is d¤(M): Yet, the fact
that g(¢) and CRe s(d;M jPass) are increasing in d;together with g(0) = 0 implies that
CRe s(0;M jPass) < g(d¤(M )) + CRe s(d¤(M );M jPass): k
Proof of Lemma 7:
For the case where M < ¸(N ¡M );this result follows immediately, since in this case
CInt(¢jPass) is declining for all d:
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Note that the F.O.C. of problem (16) is given by
g0(d) +Mf¢[!(dM;N)V ] + [RA(®)] ¡ [Z(®)]g + °[0¡ d] = 0; (22)
where ° is a Lagrange multiplier relating to the constraint that d ¸ 0. Let dI be the value
of d which satis…es (22). If dI = 0;the lemma holds. Now consider the case where dI > 0:
Then, ° = 0;and g0(dI ) +Mf[!(dIM;N)V ] + [RA(®)] ¡ [Z(®)g = 0: That g0(¢) is positive
require that Mf[!(dIM;N)V ] + [RA(®)] ¡ [Z(®)g be negative, which in turn requires that
CInt(¢jPass) is declining. Thus, dI < bd: k
Proof of Lemma 8:
In order to prove the lemma, it su¢ces to identify the condition in which dI = 0
in the problem (16). The convexity of g(¢) implies that this will be the case whenever
g0(0)+Mf[!(0; N)V ]+RA(®)¡Z(®)g > 0;which is equivalent to g0(0)+MfRA(®)¡Z(®)g >
0; since !(0; N) = 0: k
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